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COMMENTS
CONFLICTS OF LAWS-DIVERSITY JRISDICTION-
FEDERAL LAW CONTROLS OVER STATE LAW
REGARDING THE ATTORNEY WORK
PRODUCT*
Twenty-six years ago Justice Brandeis signaled the kickoff
of one of the hardest fought and most confused legal contests
of the century. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins" set out the official rules
for the state law-federal law conflict in diversity of citizenship
litigation. Those rules were unclear from the beginning and al-
though new ones have been formulated from time to time, the
officials have failed as yet to establish a concrete set of work-
able guidelines. Notwithstanding this chaotic state, the federal
team is apparently about to snatch a victory from what seemed
to be total defeat prior to 1958.
Recently the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware briefly entered the contest. In Ortiz v. H.L.H. Prod-
uot8 00.2 the court acknowledged that it was bound by the Erie
rule: "The question ... [is] whether the rulings of the Delaware
courts as to attorney work-product privileges should be applied
in a diversity case, under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins .... ,,8 How-
ever, that was as far as the court went in discussing Erie or
Erie-related rules. Judge Layton promptly proceeded to play by
an entirely different set of rules-Hickman v. Taylor.4 The
method by which he discarded Erie is unclear. His teammates
and the spectators will get little enlightenment on the question
so clearly stated. It should not be expected, however, that he will
be penalized by reversal since the dominant policy is for a fed-
eral victory.5
Hiokman v. Taylor defined the scope of the attorney-client
privilege. The holding has been epitomized by Professor Moore
in his treatise on federal practice.
(1) Information as to facts of the case and statements of
* Ortiz v. H.L.H. Products Co., 39 F.R.D. 41 (D. Del. 1965).
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. 39 F.R.D. 41 (D. Del. 1965).
3. Id. at 43.
4. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
5. Holtzoff, A Landmark in Federal Procedural Reform. 10 VTLL. L. Rnv.
701, 705 (1965) ; Cf. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
6. Supra note 4.
1
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witnesses obtained by the adverse party's attorney are not
within the common law attorney-client privilege;
(2) Even the broader policy against invasion of the at-
torney's privacy and freedom in preparation of the case
does not make them absolutely immune, but
(3) The party asking for disclosure is bound to show that
the situation is a rare one having exceptional features which
make the disclosure necessary in the interest of justice, and
(4) Where the party seeking discovery has obtained or is
able to obtain the information asked for elsewhere, he has
not met the burden.7
It is clear, therefore, that the statement and photographs in
the Ortiz case do not come within the federal definition of the
attorney client privilege. Hickman, however, was a non-diversity
case and, therefore, controlling only if federal rather than state
law regarding privileges is applicable.8 Federal law would be
applicable only if (1) the Delaware rule conflicts with one of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or (2) the privilege in-
voked is only a "form and mode" of enforcing a substantive
right and "not bound up in the rights and obligations of the
parties." In Hanna v. Plumer,9 the Supreme Court pointed out
that there are two lines of cases involving conflicts between state
and federal law in diversity cases which pose entirely different
questions and which are gauged by entirely different standards.
First, if the conflict is covered by one of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, that rule must prevail.10 On the other hand, if
the Federal Rule is not applicable, then the Erie doctrine ap-
plies, 1 as supplemented by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York12 and
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.'8
The essence of the original Erie doctrine was that state law
7. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE 26.23 (8-1) (2d ed. 1963).
8. Professor Wright says "the scope of discovery is governed entirely by the
federal rules. State law as to the scope of discovery is of no force in federal
court." WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 310 (1963). But Judge Layton's statement
that "the state of the law on this question is confused," Ortiz v. H.L.H. Pro-
ducts Co., 39 F.R.D. 41, 43 (D. Del. 1965), indicates that, either he disagrees
with Professor Wright or does not think the statement of the law is so broad
as to cover the question of privilege. If the statement were correct and appli-
cable, there would be nothing confusing about the law.
9. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
10. Id. at 470.
11. Ibid.
12. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
13. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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governed substantive matters and federal law governed proce-
dural matters.14 The Guaranty case added the limitation that
"outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court," 5 This
case de-emphasized the substantive-procedural aspect of the Erie
rule and stressed the underlying policy of Erie-discouragement
of forum shopping.' The result was that state law must apply
even in procedural matters if it appeared likely that a procedural
rule might determine the outcome of the litigation. Carried to
its extreme, the Guaranty limitation allowed state procedural
rules to practically preempt federal procedure in diversity cases1'
because almost any purely procedural rule could determine the
outcome. In 1958, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op."' at-
tempted to remedy this situation by putting another weight in
the balance in favor of federal law. To the determination of
whether the application of a federal procedural rule would likely
affect the outcome in a significant way must now be added a
further one-are there "countervailing considerations" reflecting
substantial federal policies which outweigh in final balance the
aim of like result.'0 The Erie-G-aranty-Byrd doctrine, there-
fore, can be stated generally as follows: State law governs purely
substantive matters. State law may govern in procedural matters
where the matter is not covered by one of the Federal Rules and
where a procedural rule will likely determine the outcome, pro-
vided that there exists no federal "countervailing considerations"
which outweigh the policy of like result.
The two lines of cases are (1) those cases where one of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure covers the controversy and (2)
14. This is often referred to as the substantive-procedural dichotomy. Justice
Brandeis said in the Erie opinion that Congress is powerless to declare "sub-
stantive rules of common law in a state." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938). The dichotomy was completed by Justice Reed's statement in a
concurring opinion that "no one doubts federal power over procedure." Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938).
15. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).16. See Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MicH. L.
REV. 937 (1951).
17. E.g. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) ; Woods
v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Whse. Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). See Gavit, State's Rights and Federal
Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1 (1949) ; Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan--A Triple
Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950).
18. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
19. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Monarch
Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). See generally Hill, The Erie
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where it does not. In the first situation Hanna is authority for
the proposition that the Federal Rule must prevail and that the
Eyie-Guaranty-Byrd doctrine does not apply. In the second
situation the Byrd case, as the latest case in the Erie line,
controls.
20
In Ortiz, Judge Layton did not discuss the Erie doctrine. Nor
did he cite either Byrd or Hanna. Consequently the opinion gives
no clear indication which, if either, of those cases is applicable.
Apparently he concluded that the privilege invoked here was
only a "form and mode of enforcing a substantive right," since
state law still must govern substantive matters. 21 It further ap-
pears that either he concluded this "procedural" rule would not
affect the outcome of the litigation or that there existed strong
countervailing federal considerations. If this can be assumed,
the case is an indication of how discovery, pursuant to Federal
Rule 34,22 will fare under the Erie-Cuaranty-Byrd doctrine.
The alternative possibility-that the Delaware rule conflicts
with Rule 3--is rejected because (1) the court could have ended
the matter and avoided much confusion simply by citing Hanna
V. PIumer23 for the proposition that where a Federal Rule covers
the matter it will prevail over any conflicting state law24 and
(2) Rule 34 expressly exempts from discovery matter which is
privileged. The Rule itself does not define the kind or degree of
privilege which will be recognized. 25 However, Hickman v. Tay-
lor2 could be construed as qualifying the term "privilege" in
Rule 34 and thus becoming an integral part of that Rule. With
this construction the court could have said the Delaware rule
conflicts with Rule 34 and that Hanna v. Plumer" governs. A
third and more cogent reason for rejecting this alternative is
that Judge Layton framed the question in terms of Erie.28
20. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
21. Ibid.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
23. Supra note 20.
24. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965); Holtzoff, A Landnark in
Federal Procedural Reform, 10 Vii.. L. REv. 701, 707 (1965).
25. The pertinent part of Rule 34 provides that:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor . . . the court
in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce ...
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects, or tangible things not prizileged... (Emphasis added.)
FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
26. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
27. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
28. Ortiz v. H.L.H. Products Co., 39 F.R.D. 41, 43 (D. Del. 1965).
1966]
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Although the Erie question arose in Byrd only as a side issue
and although Byrd did not expressly overrule any Erie related
case, it was a landmark decision in that it renders those cases
applying a strict "outcome determinative" test practically void
as precedents on Erie questions. After Byrd that test survives
only as a "policy" to be weighed, in each case, against "affirma-
tive countervailing federal considerations."2 9 Monarch Ins. Co.
v. Spach" adds that "not the least of these countervailing con-
siderations is the indispensable necessity that . . . [the federal
court system] must have the capacity to regulate the manner by
which cases are to be tried.""' This mere policy of the federal
court system, then, may be an adequate countervailing considera-
tion to outweigh the competing policy of "like result." Monarch
was cited by the Court in IHanna. There the policy of "federal
capacity to regulate the manner by which cases are to be tried"
was perfected at least in so far as one of the Federal Rules covers
the situation. In short, Byrd "demonstrates the wholesome de-
sire of the Supreme Court to sustain control of uniform proce-
dure in the federal judicial system, and to vindicate its complete
independence of state practice.13 2 It follows that pre-Byrd cases
must be reexamined.
In applying this current philosophy to the specific question
of "privileges," the water is still muddy. The Erie-Guaranty-
Byrd doctrine still retains the substantive-procedural dichot-
omy.33 In Monarch, the court continued to recognize that:
[M] any so called procedural rules may represent local pol-
icy on a level more fundamental than the regulation of
remedy or practice as such and that by incidental effect or
by design such rules in that sort of context are sometimes
indistinguishable from principles traditionally regarded as
substantive.
34
This statement had reference to the question of privileges. It
can be assumed that this court was aware of those cases, cited
in Ortiz, holding specifically that "privilege is a matter of pro-
29. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958).
30. 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
31. Id. at 407.
32. Holtzoff, A Landmnark in Federal Procedural Reform, 10 Vnx. L. REv.
701, 705 (1965).
33. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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cedure," 35 and cannot be said to be in accord with that premise.
The question still remains is "privilege" a matter of procedure-
only a form and mode of enforcing a substantive right-or is it
bound up with the rights and obligations of the parties? Further-
more, is a federal court at liberty to determine the kind and
degree of state created privileges which are exempt from dis-
covery?
The majority of diversity cases dealing with discovery under
Rule 34 have applied state law with regard to privilege30 but
the reasons for doing so have been varied. Some of them have
considered Erie to require it, characterizing privilege as a matter
of substance.37 It should be noted, however, that, although the
term "privilege" is applied in these cases inclusively and without
qualification, the kind of privileges dealt with were mainly priv-
ileged communications as distinguished from photographs, docu-
ments, and the like. On the other hand some cases 85 have said
"privilege is a matter of procedure and therefore federal law
governs." Most of these cases originated in a single jurisdiction8
and were based upon a quote from Professor Moore's treatise on
Federal Practice.40 Again the term "privilege" was applied
without qualification but unlike the other line of cases, ironically,
the privileges dealt with were not of the communications type
but involved tangible things like documents and photographs.
In Ortiz, Judge Layton did not expressly label either type of
privilege. Taking note of the distinction which had been drawn
in the aggregate by the courts acting independently, he applied
a theory which is different from either line of cases but the
opinion might be construed as concurring in result with both
lines. He said blandly that:
[T]here is no intention here to permit discovery under the
Federal Rules to invade those special fields of privileged
communications long established by sound public pol-
35. E.g., Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Groc. Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D.
Ohio 1953). This case synthesizes the line of cases it follows.
36. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicEs 26.23 (9) (2d ed. 1963) (Supp. 1965 at
79).
37. E.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brel, 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d
Cir. 1962); Lowe's of Roanoke Inc. v. Jefferson Std., 219 F. Supp. 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
38. Supra note 34.
39. The District Court of the Northern District of Ohio.
40. See Panella v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 196, 197 (N.D. Ohio
1961). This appears to be the first case involving Rule 34 where a party
opposed the application of state law regarding a work product privilege.
1966]
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icy .... However, the Delaware decisions have interpreted
the attorney-client privilege so broadly as to include what,
in reality, is generally regarded as an attorney's work-prod-
uct without regard to the equitable qualifications of good
cause established by Hiclkman v. Taylor.41
This, for all practical purposes, is the same as saying that fed-
eral law controls since this kind of privilege is generally re-
spected even in non-diversity cases. 4 2 Presumably, however, the
case holds that if there exists such a state created privilege which
is not also provided for by federal law, state law will control.
This apparently recognizes that the communications privileges,
"long established by sound public policy," are substantive, where-
as all other privileges are matters of procedure.
It should be re-emphasized that the Ortiz case does not fol-
low any of the lower federal court cases in classifying "privi-
lege" as substantive or procedural. It does not expressly say that
federal law controls or that it does not. It does not cite either
Byrd or Hanna or give any clear indication that either case
applied; the language of those cases is not detectable in the
opinion. It does not discuss Erie in any form. It does, however,
seem to comport with the tenor of those cases and the result
would likely be affirmed by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately,
it does not tell how it comports. Consequently, it sheds little
light on the question of how does the Erie-Guaranty-Byrd doc-
trine affect discovery proceedings in diversity cases, particularly
on the question of state created privileges. Furthermore it is not
perfectly clear that that doctrine was applied in Ortiz. The essen-
tial language of the Byrd case is conspicuously absent from the
Ortiz opinion. The outcome determinative lhnitation of Guaranty
was retained in Byrd only as a "policy" to be balanced against
41. Ortiz v. H.L.H. Products Co., 39 F.R.D. 41, 45 (D. Del. 1965).
42. The federal courts normally recognize a communications privilege if it
meets the following four conditions:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
8 WMMORE, EvIoENCE § 2285 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). For federal cases in
which this test was applied see, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275
(D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953);
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"affirmative countervailing federal considerations.""4 Although
that language was not used in Ortiz the principle was apparently
applied. If it was, the countervailing consideration seems to be
that:
The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testi-
monial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of
these privileges. They should be recognized only within the
narrowest limits required by principle. Every step beyond
these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an
obstacle to the administration of justice.44
By going directly from the Erie issue to the Hickman con-
elusion the court left the bar as confused as ever with regard to
Iow the Erie-Guaranty-Byrd doctrine affects discovery of mat-
ter protected by state created privileges. Notwithstanding this
shortcoming, the decision, when cast in the light of Byrd and
ilanna, reflects the Supreme Court's present mood to apply fed-
eral procedure in any diversity case unless the opposing state
law is clearly substantive.
It appears that Ortiz stands for the following propositions:
(1) At least to the extent that a state created attorney-client
privilege includes what Hickman v. Taylor 5 labeled "nothing
more than work product," the privilege is merely procedural-
only a form and mode of enforcing a substantive iight-and is
governed by federal law.
(2) State created privileges "long established by sound public
policy" will continue to be recognized by the federal court. Pre-
sumably this means privileged communications recognized at
common law.
(3) Even if a state does show strong policy reasons for creat-
ing the privilege and even if denial of the state privilege does
produce a substantially different result from that which would
otherwise attain, affirmative countervailing federal considera-
tions may require the result. Presumably the countervailing con-
sideration present in Ortiz is that the expansion of the common
law concept of the privilege "helps to provide, without any real
necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice. '40 Other
43. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
44. Supra note 41 at 45.
45. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
46. Supra note 41.
CoMMM'Ts1966]
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considerations could be the hardship which the deponent would
suffer if state law applied 47 or the policy of uniformity in fed-
eral procedure which seemed to weigh heavily in Byrd and
Monarch.
In conclusion, Ortiz, when read in the context of Byrd and
Hanna, represents another bold step forward in removing the
barriers to uniformity of federal practice and procedure. The
result is an accurate reflection of the present thinking of the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately the opinion is not likely to clear
up much of the confusion which has heretofore existed in this
area of the law since Judge Layton did not address himself to
the Erie question which he stated as the issue. Notwithstanding
the unanswered question of how the result was reached it seems
safe to say it is correct-that photographs and statements of
witnesses obtained by counsel in preparation for trial are not
absolutely immune from discovery in a diversity case regardless
of a contrary state rule. In such cases the standard is Hickman
I. Taylor.48
Invix D. PAJU'ti
47. Supra note 41.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-OBSCENE
LITERATURE STANDARDS RE-EXAMINED*
In a series of three cases the United States Supreme Court
again faced the controversial issue of the standard to be applied
in determining whether material is obscene and therefore not
entitled to first amendment protection. The decisions have re-
sulted in a long-awaited clarification of the prevailing standard;
but, perhaps of even more importance, was the modification and
broadening of the scope of the test. The latter result should be
welcomed both by moralists and by qualified users of materials
formerly deemed obscene; but the reception by pulp publishers
will probably be less than enthusiastic.
In the first case, A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass.,' a civil
equity suit had been brought against the book commonly
known as Fanny Hill to have the book declared obscene.2 The
trial court entered a final decree which adjudged Memoirs ob-
scene and declared the book was not within the protection
afforded by the first and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution or by the laws of Massachusetts. In affirming, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the "social
value" test of Roth v. United States3 did not require that a book
which appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive must
be unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene.4 The
United States Supreme Court reversed and held that a book can-
not be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeem-
ing social value.5
In Mishkin v. New York( the defendant had been convicted
by the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York7 of
violating § 1141 of the New York Penal Law8 and § 320(2) of
*A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Mass., 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966). Miskin v. New York, 86
Sup. Ct. 958 (1966). Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. 942 (1966).
1. 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS, Ch. 272 §§ 28C-28H.
3. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. 206 N.E.2d 403, 406-07 (Mass. 1965).
5. 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
6. 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
7. New York v. Mishkin, 26 Misc. 2d 152, 207 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1960).
8. Section 1141 of the Penal Law, in pertinent part, provides:
1. A person who . . . has in his possession with intent to sell, lend,
distribute . . . any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic,
masochistic, or disgusting book ... or who . . . prints, utters, publishes
497
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the General Business Law.9 The Appellate Division declared the
General Business Law provision an unconstitutional abridge-
ment of freedom of expression, but affirmed the obscenity con-
viction without further opinion.10 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed without opinion." On appeal Mislikin contended that
the Roth test of "prurient appeal to the average person" was not
satisfied because the materials in question were designed for and
distributed to sexual deviants exclusively and, in fact, "instead
of stimulating the erotic, they disgust and sicken." In affirming,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the prurient-
appeal requirement is satisfied if the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex
of the members of a clearly defined sexual deviant group for
whom the material is designed to whom distributed. 2
In Ginzburg v. United States'3 the defendant, along with
three corporations under his control, had been convicted' 4 on
twenty-eight counts of an indictment for violation of the federal
obscenity statute.' Each count alleged that a resident of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania received through the mail
either one of Ginzburg's publications challenged as obscene or
an advertisement telling how the publication might be obtained.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.'0 Ginz-
burg's contention, on appeal, was that his materials had consid-
erable social value and importance as evidenced by their prior
use by the medical profession and others. His conviction was
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in holding that
or in any manner manufactures or prepares such a book... or who ...
2. In any manner hires, employs, uses, or permits any person to do
or assist in doing any act or thing mentioned in this section, or any of
them, is guilty of a misdemeanor .
9. This law required that every publication other than newspapers, maga-
zines, or other periodicals shall have conspicuously printed in certain specified
places the name and address of the publisher or printer.
10. New York v. Mishkin, 17 App. Div. 2d 243, 234 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1962).
11. New York v. Mishkin, 15 N.Y.2d 671, 204 N.E.2d 209 (1964).
12. 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
13. 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).
14. United States v. Ginzburg, 224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
15. Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile article, matter,
thing, device or substance and
Every . . . advertisement . . of any kind giving information . .. by
what means any of such mentioned matters .. .may be obtained ....
Is declared to be nonmailable matter . . . Whoever knowingly uses the
mails for . .. delivery of anything declared by this section to be non-
mailable ... shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both . ...
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948).
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in close cases, evidence of pandering may be probative with
respect to the nature of the material in question. 1
The first reported decision in America concerning obscene
literature was Massachusetts v. Holmes's which, ironically, also
involved the book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure.'9 Since
that time all the states have acted with vigor to protect their
citizens from the evils of the obscene, the indecent, and the
immoral 20
It was not until 1948 that the issue of constitutional protec-
tion for "obscenity" was first raised in the Supreme Court. But
in that case, Doubleday c- Co. v. New York,21 the Court failed
to meet the challenge and without opinion affirmed by an equally
divided court 22 the conviction in the New York Court of
Appeals.
23
In Roth v. United States24 the Court for the first time held
that "obscenity" was not entitled to the constitutional protection
of the first and fourteenth amendments and did not require a
showing of "a clear and present danger" to be so excluded,
though that requirement had been previously indicated. 25 In ad-
dition the Court established the constitutional standard to be
applied to both federal and state statutes proscribing obscenity.
As set out in Roth the test defines obscenity as that which is
17. 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).
18. 17 Mass. 336 (1821).
19. Lockhart and McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, And The
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 n.200 (1954). Memoirs has been one of
the most widely litigated books in the country, e.g., Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 200 N.E2d 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1964) ; G. P. Putnam's
Sons v. Calissi, 86 N.J. Super. 82, 205 A.2d 913 (1964).
20. For examples of varied approaches from state to state in suppressing ob-
scenity, see generally Lockhart and McClure, supra note 19, at 313, 324-50. In
1930 Massachusetts convicted the seller of Theodore Dreiser's AN AMERPCAN
TRAGEDY, the court ruling that it was not error for the jury to hear only the
objectionable excerpts nor to prevent the defendant from synopsizing the book
as a whole for the jury. Compare Westberry, Georgia Scrubs Its Newsstands,
70 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1498 (1953) listing the criteria applied before the
Georgia State Literature Commission seeks judicial action; the general and
dominant theme of the material, the degree of sincerity of purpose, the literary
or scientific worth, the channels or distribution, the contemporary attitudes of
reasonable men toward the theme, the types of readers which may reasonably be
expected to peruse the publication, evidence of pornographic intent and the
impression on the mind of the reader on reading the book as a whole.
21. 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
22. Justice Frankfurter did not participate.
23. 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947).
24. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957).
25. See e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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without the slightest redeeming social importance 2 6 and whose
dominant theme, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est of the average person, applying contemporary community
standards. 27 The Court specifically rejected the two main points
of the early leading standard set out in Regina v. Hicklin,28
sometimes known as the "susceptible person test." Judging mate-
rial by the effect of an isolated eecerpt upon a particularly
susceptible person, the Court said, might well encompass mate-
rial legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as
unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and
press.
20
In Roth the question of obscenity veZ non was not raised and
the finding by the fact finders that the materials were obscene
was accepted by the Court. The test has, however, been reiterated
and delineated in a series of cases following Roth; but in none
of these cases has the Court found any materials to be obscene.
liingsZy Int'l Pictures Corp. 'v. Regents of the Univ. of New
York30 held that motion pictures are within the basic protection
of the first and fourteenth amendments31 and that the presenta-
tion of an "immoral" concept-that adultery may be desirable-
does not bring the film (Lady Chatterly's Lover) within the
obscenity exception under Roth.32 S mith v. California3" held
that dissemination of books is constitutionally protected and that
mere possession of obscene materials for the purpose of selling
is not punishable without a showing of knowledge of their con-
tents. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day3 4 reversed the barring
from the mails of magazines designed for homosexuals, two Jus-
tices agreeing that the "prurient interest" standard of Roth
encompasses the concept of "patent offensiveness" which affronts
community standards of decency. Jacobellis v. Ohio35 held that
the film Les Amants was not obscene under Roth, two Justices
26. Roth v. United States, supra note 24, at 487.
27. Id. at 489.
28. [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (emphasis added).
29. Roth v. United States, supra note 24, at 489. Compare Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 66 Pa. Dist. & Co. 101, 125 (1949): "Strictly applied, [the Hicklin]
... rule renders any book unsafe since a moron could pervert to some sexual
fantasy to which his mind is open the listings in a seed catalogue."
30. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
31. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; see generally Haimbaugh, Film
Censorship Since Roth-Alberts, 51 Ky. LJ. 656 (1962).
32. 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
33. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
34. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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agreeing3 6 that "contemporary community standards" must be
finally decided by the Court on the basis of "national stand-
ards." 
7
Once again in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts"8 the
Court was widely split in finding Fanny Hill not obscene. Mr.
Justice Brennan speaking for the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Fortas found that the Massachusetts court erred in holding that
a book need not be "unqualifiedly worthless before it can be
deemed obscene." Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the result
because the only material not entitled to constitutional protection
is "hard-core pornography." 39 Justices Black and Douglas con-
curred in the result because the first amendment precludes any
governmental censorship of the expression of ideas. 40 Justices
Clark and White, in dissenting, pointed out that the "social
importance test" stated in Jacobellis was not a majority opinion
and in Roth social importance was not a standard for determin-
ing obscenity but a justification for excluding obscenity from
constitutional protection.4' Thus, while not the majority view,
the "utterly devoid of social value" test will undoubtedly prevail
with the present makeup of the Court.
The Court was both more united and more far-reaching in its
decisions affirming the convictions of Mishkin and Ginzburg.
In Mishkin v. New York 42 the Court further defined and "ad-
justed" the "average person" of the Roth test. The materials in
question had been prepared at Mishldn's direction to depict the
practices of flagellation, fetishism, and lesbianism. The Court
held the Roth test was satisfied because the prurient-interest
36. Brennan and Goldberg, JJ.
37. See generally 17 S.C.L. REv. 639 (1964) which raises the question of
how a local jury may be expected to make a determination by applying national
standards and suggests a compromise between the rights of trial by jury and
freedom of expression.
38. 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
39. For a discussion of the "core problem" see Lockhart and McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MiNN.
L. REv. 5, 49-68 (1960) ; Lockhart and McClure, supra note 19, at 320-24. The
three possible arguments are: Pornography does or should mean the same
thing as obscenity; pornography is different from obscenity; pornography is a
more severe degree of obscenity. In Mishkin the Court seems to have clarified
its position, per Mr. Justice Brennan. "The New York courts have interpreted
'obscenity' . . . to cover only so-called 'hard-core pornography' . . . . [T]hat
definition of 'obscenity' is more stringent than the Roth definition... M" ish-
kin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
40. 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 981 (1966).
41. Id. at 989-99.
42. 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
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requirement for this type material is "to be assessed in terms
of the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient
group. 4 8 The Iicklin test is still to be disapproved in two re-
spects: (1) Examination of isolated excerpts will not be suffi-
cient; and (2) the effect on "the most susceptible person" will
not be significant if the material is designed for and dissemi-
nated to a different group or to the public at large. Thus the
Court has essentially reached the so-called "variable obscenity"
standard 44 and the standard proposed by the Model Penal
Code.45 This approach certainly seems to advance the aims of the
obscenity statutes while permitting still further freedom to the
qualified users in the scientific and literary fields. But the
Court, already burdened as the "super censor" and overseer of
private morals40 has not lightened its load by taking on the task
of passing on the probable appeal of a publication to the "sick"
and the sexually deviant, or even to the scientist, for that matter.
In Ginzburg v. United States47 the Court went even further in
adopting the Model Penal Code view of obscenity. 48 Ginzburg's
magazines (Eros and Liaison) and other publications obviously
were not devoid of social value and, in all probability, contained
considerably more than Fanny Hill. But Ginzburg did not sell
the material for its social value; rather, he was in "the business
of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to
appeal to the erotic interest of [his] customers."49 In this respect
the Court considered it of probative value, among other things,
that Ginzburg unsuccessfully sought mailing privileges from the
postmasters of Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania before
finally settling for Middlesex, New Jersey.50
43. Id. at 963. But see Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962);
One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
44. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 39, at 68-88.
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962):
"Material is obscene if considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest . . . . Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to
ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or the
circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for children or other specially
susceptible audience."
46. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 187, 190 (1964).
47, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).
48, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 45, at § 251.4(2): "a person commits a
misdemeanor if he . . . (e) sells, advertises or otherwise commercially dis-
seminates material, whether or not obscene, by representing or suggesting
that it is obscene."
49. 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 945 (1966).
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Thus to this extent, Ginzburg and Mishkin stand for the same
concept: The recipient group is material-in Ginzburg to deter-
mine whether the social value will be redeeming; in Mish/kin
to determine whether the appeal will be prurient. In Ginzburg
the major extension seems to be that the Court is not restricted
to the contents of the publication in determining its offensive-
ness but may look to extrinsic evidence of pandering or exploit-
ing an interest in obscenity for its own sake. In Mishkin and
Ginzburg the Court did not abandon the concept embodied in
the Roth standard; rather, it recognized its shortcomings and
emphasized that it will not ignore the setting and circumstances
which may be the determinative factor for questionable mate-
rials in the application of Roth.51
EMIL W. WAW
51. Id. at 949-50.
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CRIMINAL LAW - ALCOHOLISM-CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC
CANNOT BE ARRESTED FOR PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS*
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held in the case of Driver v. Hinnant1 that a chronic
alcoholic could not be criminally prosecuted for public drunken-
ness. Driver's last arrest and conviction marked his two hundred
and third apprehension for public drunkenness or related of-
fenses. As a result, Driver, age 59, has spent two-thirds of his
life in jail. This seems appalling, yet statistics show that there
are approximately five hundred thousand men and women simi-
larly situated in the United States.2 Of the two million arrests
made annually in the principal cities for all crimes, forty per
cent are made under public intoxication statutes, and an addi-
tional ten per cent are for disorderly conduct which usually in-
volves public intoxication.8 Judge Murtaugh of New York City,4
a recognized authority on the chronic alcoholic offender, classi-
fies drunks into three categories; the average or occasional
drunk, the typical social alcoholic, and the homeless, undersocial-
ized, skid-row derelict, many of whom are alcoholic. It is this
third type, the "skid-row bum," which accounts for the mass
arrests which take place throughout the country. It is this type
of person which presents one of the greatest challenges to our
"civilized" twentieth century society.
The concept of alcoholism as a disease was first espoused in
the United States one hundred and sixty-two years ago.6 Today
this concept is almost unanimously accepted. 7 The official defini-
tion of alcoholism reported by the World Health Organization's
Expert Committee on Alcoholism is:
Any form of drinking which in its extent goes beyond the
traditional and dietary use or the ordinary compliance with
the social drinking customs of the whole community con-
*Driver v. Hinnant, __ F.2d - (4th Cir. 1966).
1. Driver v. Hinnant, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1966).
2. Keller & Efron, The Prevalance of Alcoholism, 16 Q.J.S.A. 619 (1955);
Seizer, Alcoholism and the Law, 56 MICH. L. REv. 237.
3. Murtaugh, Legal Implications, Problems in Addiction: Alcoholism and
Narcotics (1962).
4. Judge Murtaugh is the Chief Justice of the Court of Special Sessions of
New York City.
5. Murtaugh, supra note 3.
6. TROTTER, EsSAY, MEDICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL AND CLINICAL ON DRUNK-
ENNESS (1804).
7. E.g., Hospitalization of Patients with Alcoholism, 162 A.M.A.J. 750
(October 1956); A.M.A., Today's Health Guide 459 (1965); World Health
Organization Expert Committee on Mental Health, Report on the First Session
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cerned, irrespective of the etiological factors leading to such
behavior, and irrespective also of the extent to which such
etiological factors are dependent upon heredity, constitution,
or acquired physiopathical and metabolic influences.8
This broad statement defines alcoholism without going into the
cause, which is largely unknown. Generally the person who be-
comes an alcoholic starts to over-drink because he seeks an escape
from problems and responsibilities; he finds this escape in al-
cohol. 10 As he uses more and more alcohol, he arrives at a point
where one drink causes him to lose control of his behavior. Even
though he may sense what is happening he has absolutely no
control over his actions, and often continues to drink until he
reaches an oblivious state. This type of person is physiologically
as well as psychologically addicted. 11 One expert notes that the
reason for such a person's physical dependence upon alcohol is
unknown, but he suggests the possibility that the body under-
goes a biochemical change at some point which varies with each
individual. After this change, the person can no longer safely
have even one drink.
12
In spite of the fact that the concept of alcoholism as a disease
has received almost complete acceptance, the method of dealing
with people like Joe Driver is the rule in nearly every American
city and town.13 This treatment of the chronic alcoholic has been
analogized to that given the mentally ill in the nineteenth cen-
tury.14 The reasoning of the courts when these cases are ap-
pealed can best be shown by an excerpt from Easter v. District
of Columbia:
Appellant was not punished because of his addiction to
alcohol. He was convicted of being intoxicated in public.
Any person whether alcoholic or not, who is drunk in any
8. KRUSE, ALCOHOLISM AS A MEDICAL PROBLRM (1956).
9. BIER, PROBLEMS IN ADDICTION, ALCOHOLISM, 63 (1965).
10. See BLOCK, ALCOHOLISM, 38-40 (1965).
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 41.
13. Notable exceptions include New York City where in 1935, Magistrate
Frank Oliver held that a case of public intoxication that contained no allegation
of another offense, would not be heard in New York's City Courts. This
practice has continued to this day and the New York City public intoxication
statute is no longer used. As a result, drunk arrests made under the disorderly
conduct statute comprise about three per cent of the city's total arrests as com-
pared to the national average of nearly fifty per cent of arrests which are
made under public intoxication and disorderly conduct statutes.
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public place in the District of Columbia is subject to the
same penalty.' 5
The courts purport to stay within the doctrine of Robinson v.
Oalifornia1 that a man cannot be punished for his status. This
reasoning is, at best, questionable. 17 Robinson can easily be read
as saying that it is as unconstitutional to punish the symptoms
of a sick person as it is to punish the disease itself.' 8
The theories behind treating these individuals as criminals ap-
parently are the same as the underlying theories for the punish-
ment of any criminal-retribution, deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion. Once the fact that alcoholism is a disease is accepted, the
theory of retribution-incarcerating the person for the wrong
he has committed against society-is totally inapplicable. The
deterrence theory, at first glance, seems warranted. The natural
inclination is to feel that if a person is punished for doing some-
thing he is less likely to do it again. Recent research suggests,
however, that this theory is as inapplicable as retribution. The
alcoholic drinks compulsively out of an innate desire to escape
the realities of life.' 9 Incarcerating him in an attempt to deter
him from drinking has proved absolutely futile.2 0 One need
only look at the record of Driver, arrested two hundred and
three times for public drunkenness or related offenses, to see
the lack of any deterrent effect of putting the alcoholic in jail.
The concept of rehabilitation is the only objective of the crim-
inal process which is close to solving the problem posed by the
chronic inebriate. Looking at this theory from the criminal
standpoint, however, it is apparent that it is not an acceptable
working solution. Doctors generally agree with other experts in
the field that alcoholism is symptomatic of many complex phy-
15. 209 A.2d 625 (D.C. 1965).
16. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
17. "Intoxication cannot in law or fact be separated from chronic alcoholism."
News Syndicate Co. Inc., 44 L.A. 308 (1964) ; Hoff, Alcoholism, The Encyclo-
pedia of Mental Health 179 (1963).
18. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Nowhere in this opinion
did the court say that a drug addict could properly be convicted for illegal
procurement, possession, or use of a narcotic drug caused by addiction.
19. BLOcK, ALco!IoLtsmt, 40 (1965).
20. "The results of our investigation negate completely the assumption that
incarceration acts as a deterrent to the chronic public inebriate." PITTM.AN &
GORDON. RFvoLVING DOOR: A STUDY OF THE CHRONIC POLICE CASE INEBRIATE
139 (1958) ; "Present procedures are failing to reduce the growth of the over-
all alcoholic problem in Washington. Not only are more arrests being made
involving more people, but the procedure apparently has very little effect as a
deterrent to the individual." Report of the Committee on Prisons Probation,
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sical, psychological and sociological factors but not limited to
any one.:' Accordingly, to rehabilitate the alcoholic, all of these
factors need attention. No one therapy or method will likely be
sufficient.2 2 Yet with very few exceptions, all that an alcoholic
who is in the city or county jail can hope for is to have himself
cared for physically with possibly an occasional visit by a psy-
chiatrist. This is largely the rule in spite of the fact that respon-
sible authorities have stated that alcoholism has the highest
recovery potential of all the major health problems in the United
States today.
23
Penal incarceration, therefore, does the chronic alcoholic no
good. In fact, the process of skid-row to jail to skid-row which
these 1)eople go through leads gradually to complete deteriora-
tion of the individual, and he eventually becomes institutional-
ized with this constant shifting developing into his pattern of
life.24 This may be as bad or worse than just leaving the person
alone and doing nothing at all about him.
When, as in Driver, the inadequacy and cruelty of the crim-
inal process becomes apparent, the problem of what to do with
these people develops. They are obviously in need of physical
and psychological care, but is this enough? Studies have shown
that the derelict type of drunk who presently clutters our
courts and jails is for the most part completely unsocialized.
These persons have no home, no family life and their only friends
are people just like themselves. They live on relief or hold jobs
only long enough to accumulate the money to regress into their
habitual state of inebriety. When the courts decide not to jail
one of these people, all they can do at the present time is release
him. His next move is inevitable; he will get drunk again, often
within an hour. Obviously, something more than just not penal-
izing these people needs to be done. However, at the present time
no one wants to assume the responsibility for starting programs
to rehabilitate the public drunk despite the fact that many of
21. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, p. 16,Easter v. District of Columbia. 209 A.2d 625 (D.C. 1965).
22. Address by Dr. Harold Lovell, Clinical Meeting of A.M.A. (Dec. 1957).23. Ibid; "The best medical opinion before our committee was to the effect
that from thirty to fifty per cent of the chronic alcoholics could be helped
if alcoholism were treated as a health problem rather than a crime." REHADILI-
TATION OF ALCOHOLICS, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Health, Edut-
cation, and Recreation, of the House Committee on the District of Columbia,
93 Co.\c. REc. 3357 (1947).
24. PITTMAN & GORDON, REVOLVING DOOR: A STUDY OF THE CHRONIC PO11CE
CASE INEBRIATE, 42 (1958).
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them could recover completely. 25 Many conventional social and
medical agencies say that the problem is not their responsibility.
The police say that it is the responsibility of the courts; the courts
point to the penal institutions and they counter with the duty of
health and mental hygiene agencies. 20 Judge lurtaugh has sug-
gested that the police and judiciary should stop passing the buck
and assume a position of leadership toward understanding the
plight of these individuals. Fortunately the courts in some of
our cities have seen fit to undertake programs to help the chronic
inebriate, 27 but the great majority of cities and counties continue
to treat the revolving door offender as a criminal. An end to
this maltreatment will come only when society decides to face
up to the problem and accepts the fact that the chronic drunken-
ness offender is not a criminal but is a sick person who not only
needs but deserves a chance to redeem himself from his pathetic
way of life.
WAYNE S. TUMTMrE.rAN
25. See note 23, supra.
26. Pittman, The Chronic Drunkenness Offender, Ain Overview, Report of
Proceedings of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Conference
on the Court and the Chronic Inebriate (1965).
27. Cities and counties with programs now in progress include: Los Angeles,
Atlanta, Miami, New York, and Detroit. The excellent format for the pro-
gram in Detroit is set out below.
Standards for Handling of Drunk Offenders in the
Denver County Court
Standard No. 1-Pre-court Custody
It is the policy of the court, whenever possible, to release defendants when
sober on personal recognizance with an order to appear in court at a specific
time. Exceptions should be (1) Where six or more drunk arrests have oc-
curred within the preceding twelve-months' period and (2) Where defendant
is in default on a previous personal recognizance.
Comment: I am not aware that this method has previously been attempted
anywhere, but our Denver experience indicates that such a program is quite
feasible. We have released thousands under this system with three noteworthy
results:
(1) Jail operations have been simplified due to the ability to reduce pre-
court population.
(2) Release of prisoners upon sobriety for later court appearance has
created no noticeable additional police problem and
(3) Having drunk defendants "walk in" to court rather than be brought in
under guard creates a much more satisfactory court experience. Con-
trary to what might be expected, the vast majority do appear usually
properly dressed, shaven and frequently with employment. See Form
A.
Standard No. 2-Fines for Early Offenders (One to Five Arrests withi; Year)











Comment: Any suggested fine schedule appears arbitrary and the suggested
basis may well appear light; however, it is rather pointless to require a fine
that is not within the reach of the average person to pay. Seldom will a drunk
docket defendant, even if employed, make as much as $10.00 per day; thus, even
the minimum fine is more than a day's work. It has been our experience that
ninety per cent or more cannot pay even this schedule if brought directly to
court from jail. If first released for several days, many will be able to pay
the fine.
Standard No. 3-Payment of Fine in Lieu of Court Appearance
First and second offenders only will be given the privilege of disposing of
their cases by the payment of the $10.00 fine, and without the necessity of a
personal appearance in court, and these offenses are listed on our General
Violations Bureau Schedule of Fines.
Standard No. 4-Denver Court Honor Class
All drunk docket defendants and others suspected of having a drinking
problem should be invited to attend the Denver Court Honor Class held every
Monday evening at 8:00 p.m. in the courtroom. See Form B.
Standard No. 5-Probation
Defendants appearing in court with from one through five arrests within a
twelve-months' period should be given the option of paying the fine or going
on "probation". Probation in such case is to last three weeks and is to consist
of the requirement that a defendant shall attend at least three meetings of the
Denver Court Honor Class, Alcoholics Anonymous or other similar meetings.
See Form C. If the defendant chooses to pay the fine but requests a stay of
execution, the court will look favorably upon a reasonable stay provided the
prior record of defendant shows no past defaults or failures to appear.
Comment: This is a compromise between the voluntary Alcoholics Anony-
mous theory and the direct compulsion method. Another attempted method
which may alternately be used with equal success is the "delayed sentence" in
which the defendant is required to appear back in court after a specified period
to report his progress and at which time to receive his sentence. The "stay of
execution" may also be used under circumstances requiring a specific report
back as to progress as a possible condition precedent to a suspended sentence.
Any method would probably achieve about equal results. We use the option
system most of the time because it gives a ready formula for fining those who
do not choose probation. Also, since the fine is not unreasonable, the defendant
has more of a free choice. Even though he will normally make the choice of
probation, it may at least be presented to him as his own choice. Possibly,
this illusion is unnecessary but, in our experience, a more satisfactory meeting
takes place where this attitude is created.
Standard No. 6-Procedure Where Defendant Has Previously Defaulted in
Payment of Fines or Has Failed to Appear
In cases where defendants with arrests of not more than five times within
the preceding twelve months are brought before the court with circumstances
indicating that the defendant has previously defaulted in the payment of a fine,
or has failed to appear after a personal recognizance release, the court will
generally adhere to the regularly scheduled fines but will not extend the
privilege of probation or additional stays of execution. The defendant might
also be charged with "failure to appear" as a supplementary charge but, in
most cases, such will be unnecessary as he will already be penalized by being
denied probation or stay of execution.
Standard No. 7-Sentence for Those Arrested Six or More Times within the
Year
In this situation, it is recommended that the minimum sentence should be
90 days in jail with a notation on the docket--"subject to parole". This will
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be the indication that the judge desires the parole staff at the County Jail to
investigate the individual and make subsequent recommendations to the court.
Any actual parole, or sentence modification, would, of course, be done by court
order. An exception to the 90-day sentence might be made where there has
been a substantial period of time, without police difficulties, prior to the last
arrest. This is especially true where the defendant gives evidence that he has
made some effort to solve his drinking problem. Under these circumstances,
the court might well, once again, consider probationary-type treatment.
Comment: It will be noted, whereas virtually no defendant is sentenced to
jail during his first five arrests, that after this the policy suddenly changes to
long sentences. The reasons may be stated as follows: The cost of continued
arrest will eventually be greater than confinement. Moreover, by this time,
it should appear obvious that the defendant has not responded to previous
methods. Generally, we have narrowed the ranks by the process of elimination
to the most extreme cases in which the prognosis for recovery is poor. The
question may be asked: Why not graduated imprisonment such as 15 days, 20
days, etc.? The answer is twofold (1) Short confinement is costly and without
benefit to society. A satisfactory work program is impossible or difficult.
(2) the chances of successful rehabilitative treatment are virtually nil for so
extreme a case in such a short time.
Standard No. 8-Serving Sentences
All sentences should be served with hard constructive and beneficial work
which will benefit both society and the defendant where the defendant is
physically able of such work.
Comment: There is some therapy in work but not in "busy work". A part
of the cost of a good rehabilitation program can be borne by the fruits of bene-
ficial labor of prisoners. The most cruel imprisonment is idleness. A great
need of many defendants is discipline and a demonstration of the rewards of
that discipline. The work effort of a prisoner should be one of the decisive
considerations in determining whether to grant parole.
Standard No. 9-Classification and Therapy during Confinement
Every prisoner should be classified and tested as to the best possible program
during confinement and as to the most effective time and method of release.
Standard No. 10-Release
It is desirable that a release not be simply "on the street" but an individual-
ized thing with the objective being the most effective integration into society
and the least likelihood of recidivism. If experience and custody indicate the
desirability of a supervised release, a prisoner may, by court order, be released
under parole custody (usually after at least half of a sentence is served) and





By Order of the Presiding Judge of the Denver County Court, the above-
named defendant, who has been arrested upon the charge of drunk, or drunk and
vagrancy and who is now, in the opinion of the undersigned officer of the
Denver City Jail, sober and capable of caring for himself, is hereby ordered
released on Personal Recognizance upon the following conditions:
1. That he will appear in court at 8:00 o'clock A.M. on the _
day of-, 19. , Room 200, Police Building, 13th and
Champa, Denver, Colorado.
2. Pending this court appearance, he will not drink any alcoholic beverage,
nor enter any bar, tavern or other establishment holding a liquor license,
23
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nor will be loiter about the streets, sidewalks or other public places in the
City and County of Denver.
3. That he will appear in court, as above stated, properly dressed, shaven and
cleaned up.





Officer, Denver City Jail
FORM B
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
INVTION
DO YOU WANT TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR DRINKING
PROBLEM? YOU SHOULDI
IF you are one who "cannot handle his liquor", that is, you decide to take only
a drink or two but, after doing so, find that you cannot resist drinking to
excess;
IF you know you should stop drinking alcoholic beverages, but find yourself
unable to do so;
IF you believe that a life lived without the use of alcohol would be a bleak
and dreary existence-something totally undesirable;
IF, after careful consideration, you realize that you need help;
THEN it would be well to seek a means of correcting this condition.
ANYONE who has an honest desire to stop drinking and is willing to acquire
a new mental attitude can remain dry.
The Municipal Judges of the City and County of Denver are concerned and
believe you can be helped if you are one of those who, of your own individual
initiative, honestly wants to stop drinking. If you are one who realized he is
powerless over alcohol and above all else desires to enjoy life and want help
with your drinking problem, then you are INVITED to attend a meeting of
an Honor Group of such persons who want to quit drinking.
This group meets every Monday at 8:00 P.M. in the Court Room or the 2nd
floor of the Police Building, 13th and Chamnpa Streets.
No fee or charge for attendance and you will not be embarrassed.
FORM C
Date Name
You have been granted probation provided you comply with the following
terms:
1. You must attend three meetings of the Denver Court Honor Class, and
your presence must be noted on this form by the Chairman of each meeting
and by the Chairman of other meetings noted.
MEETINGS VERIFICATION OF ATTENDANCE
Monday 8:00 P.M.-Police Bldg. DATE CHAIRMAN
As an alternative you may attend
any AA meeting. For informa-
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2. You must return this form to the Court on or before
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CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE PROSECUTION-ADMISSIBIL-
ITY OF CONFESSION WHEN JUVENILE COURT WOULD
HAVE JURISDICTION AT THE TIME CRIME
WAS COMMVITTED*
While attempting robbery on March 8, 1960, Eddie Harrison
and two companions committed murder. Subsequently, on March
18, 1960, Harrison became eighteen years of age. The following
day, March 19, Harrison was charged with larceny and in addi-
tion was sentenced to jail for traffic violations. The charges and
incarceration stemmed from offenses committed on March 18 and
had no connection with the attempted robbery and homicide.
On March 21, 1960, Harrison's companions confessed their
complicity in the felony, implicating Harrison. Upon confronta-
tion, Harrison made certain admissions from which the police
secured enough evidence to charge him for murder. Based upon
this complaint, Harrison for the first time was charged by the
juvenile court.
Pursuant to waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, Harrison
was convicted in the District Court for the District of Columbia.1
On appeal the conviction was reversed by the Circuit Court
holding that the inculpatory statements, though voluntarily
made while incarcerated for subsequent crimes, should be ex-
cluded when the crime in question was committed at an age
requiring juvenile court jurisdiction.
2
In recent years the treatment of juvenile delinquents has been
notably characterized in most cases by the absence of criminal
* Harrison v. United States, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1965).
1. In the first district court trial, defendant Harrison was represented by
an imposter, whose masquerade was discovered while appeal was pending. The
case was remanded with instructions that the district court entertain a motion
for new trial. On grounds of double jeopardy newly appointed counsel refused
to so move. To prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, the court of
appeals ordered a new trial. See United States v. Pcrez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579 (1824) ; see also Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Gori v.
United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
2. On appeal from conviction in the second district court trial, a division
of the D.C. Circuit Court in an opinion by Judge Danaher sustained admission
of Harrison's oral confession while reversing the conviction on other grounds.
(3-to-O). (one concurring in part). In considering only this issue, the court
en banc on rehearing barred admission with a vigorous dissent by Judge
Danaher.
3. A juvenile delinquent is generally defined as a juvenile who has violated
any law of the United States or any state law, and whose violation is not
punishable by death or life imprisonment. 11 D.C. Cona § 906 (1961) ; accord,
S.C. CoDE ANz. § 15-1103 (9) (1962).
26
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sanction. 4 The juvenile, who is generally considered to be any
person under eighteen years of age,5 is given this preferential
treatment on the basis of doubtful capacity and in the belief that
the interests of society are best served by rehabilitation through
solicitous care and training. When the juvenile commits an of-
fense the state assumes the position of parens pat7iae and cares
for the child.7 As reflective of this now traditional attitude, the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act8 provides that
the [juvenile] court shall have original and exclusive juris-
diction of all cases and in proceedings . . . concerning any
person under 21 years of age charged with having violated
any law, or violated any ordinance or regulation of the Dis-
trict of Columbia prior to having become 18 years of
age .... 9
The right to jurisdiction by the juvenile court, however, does
not always insure the juvenile of conclusive insulation from
criminal prosecution. In certain instances, 10 the court may exer-
4. As Judge Prettyman has said in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 558
(D.C. Cir. 1959):
[The juvenile who has committed an offense] is not accused of a crime,
not tried for a crime, not convicted of a crime, not deemed to be a
criminal, not punished as a criminal, and no public record is made of
his alleged offense. In effect he is exempt from the criminal law.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1965). Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103 (7)
(1962) which defines a child in the juvenile domestic relations court as a
person under seventeen years of age.
6. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
7. Ibid.
8. 11 D.C. CODE §§ 901-50 (1961).
9. 11 D.C. CODE § 907 (1961). S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1171 (1962) provides
that:
[t]he children's court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction . . . to
hear and determine all cases or proceedings involving the hearing, trial,
parole, probation, remand or commitment of children . . . in the case
of a juvenile domestic relations court, who are actually or apparently
under the age of seventeen years or who were under the age of seventeen
years when the act of offense is alleged to have been committed or the
right of action in such case or proceeding accrued ....
10. The Juvenile Court Judge for the District of Columbia has set forth the
following determinative criteria with respect to waiver of jurisdiction:
(1) Seriousness of the alleged offense.
(2) Whether alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or wilful manner.
3) Whether alleged offense was committed against person or property.
4) Prosecutive merit of the complaint.
5) Desireability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court where associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
charged with a crime in the United States District Court.
(6) Sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by con-
sideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and
pattern of living.
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cise its statutory authority to waive jurisdiction over the offense
therein causing the juvenile to be subjected to the full criminal
process.-1 Since the non-punitive atmosphere of the juvenile
court is conducive to free admission, such waiver places the juve-
nile in the precarious position of having these statements used
against him in the criminal court. It is obvious the prosecution
can not proceed under the "regular" and juvenile procedures con-
currently, nor can it proceed partially under each.' 2 Conse-
quently, original detention by the juvenile court induces response
to rehabilitative surroundings without regard to protection,
should the right of waiver be exercised. Increased time differen-
tial, between the act and confession, makes the problem more
acute and in the event of waiver the prosecuting court faces a
difficult question.' 3 Are the rights of juveniles to be in disparity
of those afforded adults in prosecution for similar offenses?
Although there are decisions protecting adult rights this problem
is inherent to the juvenile system and can be resolved only
through its applicable legislation and case law.14
In Pee 'v. United States' 5 the defendant was seventeen years
old and had been charged in the juvenile court with serious fel-
onies. After retention of Pee for two weeks, the juvenile court
waived its jurisdiction in favor of prosecution which subsequent-
ly, on the basis of pre-waiver statements, resulted in Pee's con-
viction. On appeal the case was remanded to the lower court for
(8) Prospects of adequate protection of the public and the lkelihood
of reasonable rehabilitation.
Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 252-53, n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
11. D.C. CODE § 914 (1961) provides:
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense
which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child
charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable
by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation,
waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the regular
procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offenses
if committed by an adult ....
accord, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1171 (1962).
12. Pee v. United States, supra note 6.
13. Harrison v. United States, __ F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1965).
14. See, e.g., Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to
counsel when questioning becomes accusatorial) ; Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957) (right to be taken before magistrate within reasonable time).
Though these cases are illustrative of protecting adult rights, Harrison was
originally charged by the juvenile court which has no such requirements. Since
it is not possible to use both procedures, a fortiori, the issue must be determined
from judicial decisions involving the juvenile process.
15. 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959). But see, State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501,
161 A.2d 520 (1960). This case held that pre-waiver statements by a child
were admissible in subsequent adult proceedings but is distinguishable on the
basis that New Jersey courts did not follow the Mallory rule.
1966]
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hearing to determine the application of the Federal16 and Mal-
Zory v. United States'7 exclusionary rules to these pre-waiver
statements. The case is not directly applicable to the Hlarrison
situation but the fundamental thinking laid the foundation for
the decision in Harling v. United States.1
8
Since the nature of the juvenile process is exempt from crim-
inal connotations, as a practical matter the Federal and Mallory
exclusionary rules have no general application.' To avoid the
inappropriateness of these strict safeguards to the flexible and
informal proceedings of the juvenile court, Harling establishes
as a basis for exclusion the fundamental fairness to the juvenile
and preservation of the integrity of the system. In a fact situa-
tion similar to Pee, the case barred admission, in the event of
subsequent waiver and criminal trial, of statements elicited from
a juvenile while he was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. The court remarked that a contrary holding would "be
tantamount to a breach of faith with the child, since he cannot
be charged with knowledge of either his privilege against self
incrimination or the Juvenile Court's power to waive its juris-
diction."20 With Harling as a precedent, it seems compelling
that the Harrison confession be excluded. There is a contention,
however, that Edwards v. United States21 construes the Juvenile
Court Act 2 2 as encompassing only situations where the juvenile
has been actually charged.
23
Waiving its jurisdiction, the juvenile court allowed Edwards
to be tried for forcible robbery. At the trial one of his accom-
16. FED. R. CUL P. 5(a).
17. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
18. 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
19. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
20. Id. at 163.
21. 330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
22. Supra note 9.
23. In Harrison v. United States, supra note 13 at - (dissenting opinion)
Judge Danaher concludes this from what the court said in Edwards:
The Harling case bars the Government from using against an accused
in a criminal trial a confession or admission officially obtained from him
when he was a juvenile detained under the auspices of the Juvenile Court,
where the latter court has subsequently waived its jurisdiction and trans-
ferred the accused for trial to the District Court. Our ruling in Harling
resulted from the special practices which follow the apprehension of a
juvenile. He may be held in custody by the juvenile authorities-and is
available to investigating officers-for five days before any formal action
need be taken. There is no duty to take him before a magistrate, and no
responsibility to inform him of his rights . . . . Harling is a simple recog-
nition that it would be unfair to the individual juvenile and a mockery of
the juvenile system to allow unrestricted use of evidence, gathered through
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plices, who had been placed on probation by the juvenile court,
testified. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground
that the witness' identity was learned from a confession given
while in custody of the juvenile court. In affirming allowance
of the testimony, the court on appeal said that the "purpose of
Harling is not to deter improper police conduct" since "evidence
obtained through juvenile custody is not necessarily 'fruit of the
poisonous tree' "24 but merely points out that "fruit of an un-
tainted tree may become poisonous when improperly used."25
The inference here is not that the juvenile must be actually
charged to exclude admissions, but simply is a recognition of
possible exclusion required by some factual circumstances.
28
When special treatment is afforded juveniles, there is always a
risk of harm to society from those with criminal propensity. A
more subtle risk of social harm rests in the protection given juve-
niles who are old enough to know and understand the legal con-
sequences of their criminal acts.27 Indicative of this is the volun-
tariness of Harrison's confession which was motivated by a desire
for self preservation and given at an age precluding juvenile
protection. 28 Serious consideration is to be given this interest,
but where it reduces protection of the juvenile, it can serve only
to impair the system.29
To avoid such impairment it is "clear that the exclusion of
admissions . . .applies . . . to all statements when [the juve-
nile] is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile
court."30 Since compliance with Congressional instruction3 l re-
quires that the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act "be liberally
construed" in accomplishing the rehabilitative purposes of the
law, exclusive jurisdiction exists from the moment the juvenile
24. Cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
25. Harrison v. United States, supra note 13.
26. Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
27. Ibid.
28. When confronted by his companions, Harrison asked police officers,
"Well, what did they tell you?" Though ignorant of the felony-murder doc-
trine, he then proceeded with the skill of any layman to exonerate himself in
relating his own version of the crime.
29. Harrison v. United States, supra note 13.
30. Id. at -.
31. 16 D.C. CODE § 2316 (Supp. 1965).
1966]
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commits the offense.8 2 Consequently, this syllogism establishes
inadmissibility of the Harrison confession.3 3 In preserving
parens patriae, the court in effect has refrained from condemn-
ing Harrison to the anomaly of being too old for juvenile court
protection and yet too young for adult protection. Otherwise,
the juvenile proceeding would serve only as an adjunct to and
part of the adult criminal process.
Wsimy L. BnowN
32. Harrison v. United States, supra note 13. Compare United States v.
White, 153 F. Supp. 809 (D.D.C. 1957). In facing the actually chargcd jur-
isdictional problem the court found also other independent and complete
answers:
(1) "Case and controversy" concept not applicable-by reason of Art.
I, sec. 8, cl.17 of the United States Constitution, jurisdiction in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Juvenile Court does not require a case or controversy
as in article III courts. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 546
(1933) ; Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1923). But cf.,
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
(2) Anticipatory equity jurisdiction-though there is no criminal "case
or controversy" until a crime is formally charged, the court has anticipa-
tory equity jurisdiction to "reach forward" and control improper prepara-
tion of evidence. See Smith v. Katzenbach, - F2d - (D.C. Cir.
1965).
33. Harrison v. United States, supra note 13. In South Carolina the Harri-
son situation cannot arise because a juvenile over seventeen years of age will
not to be subject to jurisdiction of the juvenile domestic relations court. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-1171 (1962). This type problem should never arise because
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1202 (1962) provides that no "confession, admission or
statement made by [a child] to the [juvenile domestic relations] court or to
any officer thereof while he is under the age...of seventeen years... shall
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TRADE REGULATIONS-VENUE UNDER SECTION
TWELVE OF THE CLAYTON ACT*
Jurisdiction and venue are often confused and used synon-
omously in the legal profession, although the basic distinction
is quite clear. Jurisdiction is the power to decide a case on the
merits, whereas venue relates to the place where the suit may be
heard.' Jurisdiction under the antitrust laws is given to the fed-
eral district courts2 and consequently little controversy arises.
Venue, however, under the special provisions of the Clayton Act
has caused much controversy and has led to many varying inter-
pretations. It appears well settled now that when section twelve
was added the intention of Congress was to enlarge the venue
provision so as to relieve the injured party from the often
"insuperable obstacle" of having to sue in some distant forum in
which the corporation may be found,4 and to assist the govern-
ment in enforcing the act by allowing private suits to be more
easily brought through the more liberal venue provision.;
Consequently, the quantum of business which must be trans-
acted by a corporation to support venue in an antitrust suit is
less than the "doing business" requirement necessary to sustain
service of process in other cases.6 Section twelve of the Clayton
Act reads as follows:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judi-
cial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and
all process in such cases may be served in the district of
* B. J. Semel Associates, Inc. v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc., 335
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
1. Toulmin v. James Manufacturing Co., 27 F. Supp. 512, 515 (W.D.N.Y.
1939).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 (1962).
4. This section supplements the remedial provision of the anti-trust act for
the redress of injuries resulting from illegal restrains upon interstate
trade, by relieving the injured person from the necessity of resorting for
the redress of wrongs committed by a non-resident corporation, to a
district, however distant, in which it resides or may be "found" .... often
an insuperable obstacle... and enabling him to institute the suit in a
district, frequently that of his own residence, in which the corporation
in fact transacts business and bring it before the court by the service of
process in a district in which it resides or may be "found".
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,
374 (1927).
5. Note, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 268 (1962).
6. Windsor Theatre Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 871 (D.C. 1948).
519
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss3/6
SOUTH CAROLIwA LAW RE w
which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
(Emphasis added.) 
7
It is with the words "transacts business" within this section
that this discussion will be concerned. As Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said in his concurring opinion in United States v. Sco-
phony, "whether a corporation is found or transacting business
is a question of fact and turns on the unique circumstances of a
particular situation."8 It depends upon the type of business in-
volved and does not necessarily mean that offices, agents, or
even a "product" in the physical sense must be present. For in-
stance, a company could transact business by rendering super-
visory and management services, 9 and actual sales of a corpora-
tion are not necessary.' 0
"The source of trouble lies in the use of verbs descriptive of
the behavior of human beings to describe that of entities charac-
terized by Chief Justice Marshall as 'artificial . . ., invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.'"" All
corporate action being vicarious, any test of "transacting busi-
ness" is difficult to apply.
The first test laid down by the Supreme Court was in the
leading case of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Mate7ials
Oo.12 There the Court said that "a corporation is engaged in
transacting business in a district . .. if in fact, in the ordinary
and usual sense, it 'transacts business' therein of any substantial
character."1 3 The essential words of the test became "ordinary
and usual" and "substantial." This test was followed until 1918
when the Supreme Court in Scophony expanded the test to "the
practical everyday business or commercial concept of doing or
carrying on business of any substantial character."14 This re-
mains as the test today.
Sunbury lVire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States SteeZ Corp.
continued the broadening trend of the Scophony test where the
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 22 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
8. 333 U.S. 795, 819 (1948).
9. Exhibitors Scrv. v. Abbey Rents, 135 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
10. Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3, 7 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
11. United States v. Scophony, 333 U.S. 795, 802 (1948), quoting from
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
12. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
13. Id. at 373.
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court said that the test was whether "sales would appear to be
substantial from the average businessman's point of view."' 5
Recently, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia in B. J. Semel Associates, Inc. v. United Fireworks Mfg.
Co., Inc.16 seemed to apply the most liberalized version of the
test yet. It did away with the technical meanings used in the test
and substituted the question as if asked of one ordinary business-
man to another, "Do you do any business in state X?" The court
has more recently applied the same standard in Levin v. Joint
Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosp. when it said, "we doubt that
the Commission, as a practical matter, either does, or prefers to,
think of itself as not exercising its functions in the district.' 17
It apparently has brought about the realization of the definition
of "transacting business" to the practical everyday concept.
The S eel decision, which was solely a question of venue, was
based on the frequent telephone conversations between the plain-
tiff and the defendant and the amount of sales involved. The
court seems to reason that the telephone is a substitution of or
mere advancement over the use of salesmen in business dealings.
And indeed, in many instances, it is. It should be noted, however,
that the conversations were not solicitations.
The defendant had no office, property, or personnel in the
District of Columbia; it used no salesmen, sales agents, or adver-
tising in the district to solicit business. Price lists were mailed
into the District only upon specific request. The defendant had
three customers in the District to whom sales were made pur-
suant to unsolicited requests received in Dayton, Ohio, and all
deliveries were F.O.B. Dayton with transportation completely
arranged by the buyer. Over a two-year period, sales to two of
the customers totalled about 2,700 dollars. During this same pe-
riod, sales to the plaintiff totalled about 167,100 dollars. The
court said although physically remote the contacts of the de-
fendant were continuous and substantial. This case apparently
furthers the theory that the only way to avoid venue is to confine
one's business to completely intrastate activities.'
8
15. 129 F. Supp. 425, 427 (E.D.Pa. 1955).
16. 355 F.2d 827 (D.C.Cir. 1965).
17. Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosp., 354 F.2d 515, 517
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
18. 355 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
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While some cases consider the quantity"' or percentage of
sales,20 some the absolute amount as opposed to percentage,2 1
others say that small sales are not the test of substantiality.
2-
This was probably best stated in Donlan v. Carval :23 "The
amount of percentage necessary to make business substantial may
vary, depending upon the context in which the question
arises . . .. [Ajlthouglh the dollar amount was small, the sales
were continuous .... " In Levin it was more recently said that
the fact that a corporation's business may be insubstantial and
irregular will not automatically negate section twelve's applica-
bility. The small sales percentage can be an important element
in the corporation's purposes, and it may in combination with
similarly small operations "account for the very sizeable scope
of the corporation's business. '24 Generally, unless the quantum
of activity is very small the corporation will be transacting
business.25
The word "continuous" appears to play a major part in the
determination of what is "substantial126 as does the word "fre-
quent. '27 While the venue provision has broad meaning it still
"embraces elements of substantiality of business done, with con-
tinuity in character.12  It therefore seems that where a volume
of sales is lacking in terms of dollar value the court will still
find venue if there is any continuity in small sales.
Some courts may base their decision on whether the sales are
solicited and continuous. A single unsolicited sale by a small
company, which amounted to a significant portion of its total
sales for that year, might not amount to transacting business for
venue purposes. But, a continuous series of solicited sales over
19. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 208 F. Supp. 936
(N.D.IlI. 1962); Reid v. University of Minn., 107 F. Supp. 439 (N.D.Ohio
1952).
20. Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
21. Katz Drug Co. v. W. A Sheaffer Pen Co., 6 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo.
1932) ; Green v. United States Chewing Gum Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.
1955).
22. Lower Colorado River Authority v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 219 F.
Supp. 743 (W.D. Texas 1963).
23. 193 F. Supp. 246, 248 (D. Md. 1961).
24. Supra note 17, at 517.
25. Supra note 5.
26. Brandt v. Renfield Importers, Ltd. 278 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1960) ; Westor
Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D.N.J.
1941).
27. Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.M.
1962).
28. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 208 F. Supp.
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long periods of time and amounting to a small percentage of
total sales for a large company would amount to transacting
business. 29 If sales are extremely light, sporadic, and unsolicited,
it does not amount to transacting business.
Passage of title or risk of loss of an article sold does not con-
trol, but delivery within the concept of section twelve is delivery
in the practical everyday business or commercial concept.30 This
negates any attempted avoidance of venue by the use of F.O.B.
terms. However, delivery itself even without F.O.B. terms does
not necessarily subject a defendant to venue jurisdiction if the
delivery is insubstantial.
31
Thus it appears that no one particular activity alone will be
determinative of whether a corporation is "transacting business,"
but that the decisions are usually based on a combination of
elements.
Although the court in Scophony disapproved the checklist
theory in deciding whether a corporation "transacts business"
the following list from the New York University Law Review
may be of some help in furnishing guidelines since in the end
the decision is largely factual and must be based on some mani-
festations of doing business:
1. Place to do business: office, factory, warehouse, repair fa-
cilities or research facilities.
2. People to carry on business: directors, officers, employees,
sales representatives, agents, registrar, transfer agent or
agent to receive process.
3. Tangible property: real estate, inventory, leased premises,
bank accounts, and corporate records or books of account.
4. Subjection to state regulation: secured certificate of incor-
poration or license to do business, paid franchise tax or
filed state tax returns.
5. Business operations: sales volume, purchases, solicitation
by salesmen within the district, solicitation by mail or tele-
phone from without the district, contractual negotiations
29. School Dist. v. Kurtz Bros., 240 F. Supp. 361, 363 (E.D.Pa. 1965);
Naifen v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 491 (W.D.Okla. 1953)
30. 129 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.Pa. 1955); Contra Ohio-Midland Light & Power
Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 221 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.Ohio 1962).
31. Dazian's Inc. v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
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in the district, orders accepted in the district, passage of
title within the district or making of executive decisions.
6. Manifestations of doing business: telephone listing name
on building directory, office referred to in advertising lit-
erature, catalogue, letterhead, interoffice memoranda.
7. Goodwill Activities: visits by officers and employees, ad-
vertising or other promotional activity.32
Whether venue is established will be governed, therefore, by
the "own peculiar set of facts [of each case]; and it is the totality
of acts and conduct . . . rather than isolated and fragmented
items thereof which govern."3
1PEDEN B. McLmoD
32. Note, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 268, 283
(1962). This is an excellent, well documented article on venue in antitrust
suits generally.
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